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Abstract
Consider a seller who can make an observable but non-contractible investment to improve an intermediate
good that is specialized to a particular buyer’s needs. The buyer then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
seller. The seller has private information about the fraction of the ex post surplus that he can realize on his
own. Compared to a situation with complete information, additional investment incentives are generated by
the seller’s desire to pretend a strong outside option. On the other hand, ex post efficiency is not attained
since asymmetric information at the bargaining stage sometimes leads to inefficient separations.
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1. Introduction
This paper offers a new perspective on the hold-up problem, which is a central ingredient
of the modern property rights approach to the theory of the firm based on incomplete con-
tracting. In the seminal contributions of Grossman and Hart [4] and Hart and Moore [6], an
agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment that increases the surplus that
can be generated within a given relationship more than it increases the agent’s default payoff
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684 S. Goldlücke, P.W. Schmitz / Journal of Economic Theory 150 (2014) 683–708(i.e., the payoff that he can realize outside of the relationship).1 When the investing party does
not have all the bargaining power ex post, it does not get the full returns of its investment, so
that in general there is an underinvestment problem. The fact that investments are partly (but
not fully) relationship-specific is crucial in this literature, because all that governance structures
(e.g., ownership arrangements) affect is what a party can get outside of the relationship. It is a
standard assumption that there is symmetric information between the parties, so that they always
agree on the ex post efficient decision to collaborate, but ex ante investment incentives depend on
the payoffs that the parties could achieve outside of the relationship, so that institutions matter.
More recently, several authors have argued that the incomplete contracting literature may have
overemphasized the relevance of encouraging ex ante investments while it has almost completely
neglected the possibility of ex post inefficiencies. In particular, Williamson [26, p. 605] empha-
sizes that this is the “most consequential difference” between transaction cost economics and the
property rights theory.2 In this paper, we take up this line of criticism, by assuming that a party
may have better information than its trading partner about the fraction of the surplus that the
party can realize on its own.3 Under this plausible assumption, underinvestment problems are
ameliorated and ex post inefficiencies become relevant; i.e., the incomplete contracting approach
moves closer to transaction cost economics in the sense of Williamson [24,25].
Specifically, consider a seller who can invest in order to increase the value of an intermediate
good. The good is specialized to the needs of a particular buyer. The parties cannot write a
contract ex ante. If the parties do not reach an agreement ex post, the seller can realize only a
fraction θ  1 of the ex post surplus on his own. Hence, it is always ex post efficient for the
two parties to trade the intermediate good. For simplicity, we assume that the buyer can make
a take-it-or-leave-it offer ex post, so that the hold-up problem is most severe. Under complete
information, ex post efficiency would always be achieved, but the seller would underinvest, since
the buyer would hold up the seller; i.e., she would offer only a fraction θ of the gains from
trade.
Our key innovation is to assume that from the outset the seller has private information about
the fraction θ of the ex post surplus that he can realize on his own.4 It turns out that the seller’s
private information may stimulate larger investment levels compared to the case of complete
information, because there is a signaling motive in the seller’s investment choice. The buyer will
try to deduce the seller’s outside option from the chosen level of investment. If the seller chooses
a small investment level, it seems likely that he has a weak outside option, so that the buyer will
1 For a recent survey of the literature, see Segal and Whinston [20], who point out that “hold-up models, whose use for
examining the optimal allocation of property rights began with the seminal contribution of Grossman and Hart [4], have
been a workhorse of much of organizational economics over the last 20 years” (p. 103). See also [7] for a comprehensive
exposition.
2 Williamson [27, p. 188] argues it is “deeply problematic” that the incomplete contracting models assume ex post
efficient bargaining under symmetric information. Holmström and Roberts [10] and Whinston [23] also point out that the
standard property rights models might be too narrowly focused on the underinvestment problem.
3 Our contribution is thus in line with Holmström [9], who points out that the assumption in the incomplete contracting
literature according to which both parties observe the default payoffs deserves more scrutiny. Similarly, Malcomson [15]
has argued that an employer may not know an employee’s outside option and he remarks that little is known about hold-up
under such circumstances. That asymmetric information plays a role for welfare in a hold-up model is also recognized
by Gul [5], Lau [12], and Sloof [21], who also provides experimental evidence.
4 For instance, the seller may be privately informed about the probability of finding an alternative trading partner, or
about the difficulty to adapt the intermediate good to another buyer’s needs, or about his ability to use the intermediate
good himself to produce a final good. See also [19] for a related model in which the seller learns the fraction of the
surplus that he can realize on his own after the investment is sunk, so that no signaling can occur.
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believe that the seller has a strong outside option, in which case she would have to make a high
offer. Hence, a seller with a weak outside option may have an incentive to mimic a seller with a
strong outside option. It turns out that this effect indeed can mitigate the hold-up problem. We
find that the outside option signaling game has an essentially unique equilibrium outcome. All
perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game with an arbitrarily fine grid of possible types lead to the
same payoffs and distribution of investments.
If the seller’s maximum possible outside option is known to be relatively low compared to
the value of the investment within the relationship, all types of sellers invest the same amount.
Specifically, they choose the investment level that the type with the maximum outside option
would choose under symmetric information. Clearly, in such a pooling equilibrium ex post effi-
ciency is achieved and investments and joint surplus are higher than in the case with complete
information.
In general, however, the equilibrium is a hybrid (semi-pooling) equilibrium. There is a cut-off
type such that all sellers with a lower outside option pool on this type’s strategy. This cut-off
type, and all higher ones, mix between their own and all higher types’ complete information
investments.5 While the information asymmetry leads to higher investments, this comes at the
expense of the ex post inefficiencies which occur when the buyer, who mixes between different
offers, mistakenly tries to call the seller’s bluff by making an offer that is smaller than the seller’s
outside option. How the joint surplus compares to the case with complete information therefore
depends on the parameters of the model.
The outside option signaling game that we introduce in this paper is quite distinct from stan-
dard signaling games, because the cost of the signal is constant across types, and the benefit
depends only indirectly on types. Specifically, types only matter if the uninformed buyer makes
a sufficiently low offer, so that ex post inefficient separation occurs.6 Moreover, different types of
sellers would choose different levels of investment if information was symmetric. Finally, while
signaling games are typically plagued by a multiplicity of equilibria, refinements to pin down
beliefs following zero probability events are not needed in our model.
While for the main part of the paper we follow the incomplete contracting literature in assum-
ing that no contracts are written before the investment is made, we also explore the consequences
of ex ante contracting when investments are verifiable. In this case, the buyer can offer a menu
of contracts that require a certain level of investment. The main result is that the investment is
always set at the first-best level and the optimal contract uses different separation probabilities
as the unique screening device. Whenever the optimal contract specifies a positive probability
of separation for some types, then these types overinvest given how the investment is later used,
because conditional on taking the outside option with a positive probability, efficiency implies
an investment level lower than the first-best one. The result thus adds a new twist to the literature
on screening models with type-dependent outside options [16,13,14,11,17].
5 A characteristic of our signaling model is hence a “bluffing” element that leads to an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
The fact that the equilibrium is in mixed strategies due to a commitment problem is somewhat reminiscent of equilibria
in hold-up problems with unobservable investments as studied in Gul [5] and Gonzales [3]. Yet, note that in contrast to
these papers we follow the incomplete contracting literature in assuming that investments are observable.
6 Spence [22] contains an example with similar features, in which firms can learn a worker’s productivity at a cost. In
this case, high productivity types separate by moving to firms that learn the type, and low types pool in a firm that does
not learn. Other papers that consider productive signaling include [8], in which a leader may signal a worthwhile project
by exerting high effort, and [2], in which a signaling motive helps a team to overcome a free-riding problem.
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game is introduced. In Section 3, we first go through the special case of two possible types in
order to illustrate the kind of equilibria that we find also in the general cases of a finite type space
and a continuum of types. While it is very natural to think about the problem using a model
with a finite type space, the analysis is quite technical and therefore postponed to Section 6. The
results are used to find the limit equilibrium in the case of an atomless distribution, which is
introduced in Section 4. The screening version of the model, in which the buyer can offer a menu
of contracts with contractible investment levels, is analyzed in Section 5. Proofs are relegated to
Appendix A.
2. The model
The model describes an interaction between a buyer and a seller.7 We first describe and solve
the game with complete information and then introduce asymmetric information.
In the game with complete information, the seller chooses an investment i ∈ I, at cost c(i), to
improve the value of an intermediate good or a service to be traded. If seller and buyer agree on
trade, they can together generate a value of v(i), while the value that the seller can realize without
the buyer is only the fraction θv(i), where θ ∈ Θ ⊂ [0,1].8 The buyer observes the investment
and thus the value of the good and makes an offer about how to share the surplus with the seller.
If the seller rejects the offer, he gets θv(i) from taking his outside option, while the buyer makes
zero profit. If the seller accepts, they split the generated surplus as proposed by the buyer.
Throughout, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. Let I = R+, and let the functions v and c be differentiable, increasing, and con-
cave resp. strictly convex. Furthermore v(0) 0, c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0, and limi→∞ c′(i) = ∞.
It is assumed that the parties cannot write a contract ex ante. After having observed the chosen
investment level, the buyer can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. If θ is the type of the
seller, i the seller’s investment, o ∈ [0,1] the buyer’s offer, expressed as a share of the surplus,
and a ∈ {0,1} the acceptance decision of the seller, then the seller’s payoff is given by(
ao + (1 − a)θ)v(i) − c(i) (1)
and the buyer’s payoff by
a(1 − o)v(i). (2)
The complete information game can easily be solved by backward induction. The seller will
accept all offers o > θ , and since the buyer could always increase her offer by an arbitrarily
small amount, we assume that the seller accepts all offers o  θ .9 The buyer will offer a share
θ of the realized surplus, which the seller will accept, leaving him a profit of θv(i) − c(i) from
investment i. In anticipation of this return to his investment the seller invests
7 The model is sufficiently abstract to also fit other settings such as an employer–employee relationship.
8 There does not need to be a deterministic relationship between the investment and the resulting value. As long as the
principal can observe the investment and the value, with some notational changes the analysis would extend to the case
that v(i) represents the expected value generated by investment i.
9 This holds for all types except θ = 1. Since the buyer makes no profit on this type, it does not matter whether we
assume that this type rejects or accepts an offer of 1.
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ic(θ) = arg max
i
θv(i) − c(i), (3)
which given Assumption 1 always exists and is unique. Moreover, ic is a strictly increasing
function, which implies that its inverse exists, which we denote by θc : ic(Θ) → Θ . Hence, there
is underinvestment compared to the first best investment level ic(1), which maximizes the net
surplus
S(i) = v(i) − c(i). (4)
The seller’s payoff under complete information, in dependence on the outside option θ , is denoted
by
uc(θ) = max
i
θv(i) − c(i). (5)
Note that uc is increasing and strictly convex.10 If the type space Θ is an interval, then the
derivative of uc is equal to v ◦ ic .
Next, consider the game with incomplete information, where θ is private information of the
seller. The sequence of events is illustrated in Fig. 1. We assume that first the seller learns his
type θ , which is drawn from the type space Θ ⊂ [0,1] according to a distribution function F .
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. F is log-concave.11
The buyer only knows the distribution of the outside option, but not the realized value. She
observes the seller’s investment, forms beliefs about the outside option and then makes a take-it-
or-leave-it offer that is optimal for her given her updated beliefs about the acceptance threshold
of the seller. We are interested in perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. In any such equilib-
rium a seller of type θ will accept an offer if and only if it is greater than the outside option.
We therefore fix this acceptance decision (which is the same as in the game with complete infor-
mation), as the outcome following the buyer’s offer. In the remainder of the paper, we then deal
with the following reduced-form payoff functions: If the seller is of type θ and invests i, and the
buyer makes an offer o, then the seller gets max(θ, o)v(i) − c(i) and the buyer gets (1 − o)v(i)
if θ  o, and 0 otherwise.
10 We could alternatively make this assumption directly or replace the conditions in Assumption 1 by other conditions
from which it follows. That is, investment decisions can be allowed to be multi-dimensional or discrete as long as the
optimal investment levels lead to an increasing and strictly convex function uc .
11 This assumption means here that Fλ(θ)F 1−λ(θ ′)  F(λθ + (1 − λ)θ ′) for all θ, θ ′ ∈ Θ and λ ∈ [0,1] with λθ +
(1 − λ)θ ′ ∈ Θ .
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device to mix over a set of investments. A strategy of the seller thus is a function Q : Θ ×
I → [0,1] such that Q(θ, .), or Q(.|θ), is the distribution of investments that a type θ chooses.
A strategy of the buyer maps investments into a share of the surplus that she offers to the seller,
where she as well may randomize over a set of offers. While a pure strategy is given by a function
from the set of investments I to the set of offers [0,1], we write a mixed strategy as a function
P : I × [0,1] → [0,1], where P(i, o), or Pi(o), is the probability that the buyer’s offer, when
observing investment i, is less than or equal to o.
If the buyer’s strategy is given by P , a seller of type θ who chooses investment i gets the
expected profit
U(P, i, θ) = v(i)
∫
max(θ, o) dPi(o) − c(i). (6)
Given a strategy Q of the seller, the buyer’s expected payoff from the pure strategy o : I → [0,1]
is
V (Q,o) =
∫ ∫
[θo(i)]
(
1 − o(i))v(i) dQ(i|θ) dF (θ). (7)
3. The two-type case
In this section, we illustrate the effects that are at work in the model by first looking at the
case in which there are only two possible types, 0 < θL < θH < 1. Let fL denote the probability
that the outside option is low, and fH = 1 − fL the probability that it is high. The analysis of a
more general model with more than two types (in Section 6) involves some technicalities that are
absent in this special case, which nevertheless conveys much of the intuition.
We start with the buyer’s offer decision. It is clear that offering any share greater than θH
ensures acceptance, and among those offers θH is the most profitable one for the buyer. Similarly,
any offer strictly lower than θL is sure to be rejected, and is thus weakly dominated by offering θL.
Offers between θL and θH are accepted by the low type only, and θL is the cheapest one with this
outcome. Therefore, the buyer essentially chooses between offers θL and θH according to her
beliefs. Specifically, she will offer θH if she believes that the probability of a low outside option
is smaller than 1−θH1−θL .
Next, consider a high-type seller. This seller type knows that for any investment i he will get
θHv(i) ex post, given that it is never optimal for the buyer to offer more than θH . Therefore,
he invests iH = arg max θHv(i) − c(i). His payoff is his complete information payoff uc(θH ),
which reflects that there is no incentive to mimic lower types in this game. Given this strategy
of the high type in any possible equilibrium, it is clear that a seller with a low outside option
would reveal his type if he invests any amount different from iH . A separating equilibrium, in
which the low type invests iL = arg max θLv(i) − c(i) and is offered θL, cannot exist, since the
low type would then have an incentive to mimic the high type and get the payoff uc(θH ), which
is larger than uc(θL). The best the low type can hope for is to pool with the high type and get
uc(θH ). Pooling on iH is indeed an equilibrium if the buyer makes the high offer in case both
types invest iH , i.e., if fL  1−θH1−θL .
If the pooling equilibrium does not exist, the only possibility left is a hybrid, or semi-pooling,
equilibrium, in which the low type mixes between high and low investment. The low type is
indifferent between high and low investment if the probability of offer θL following investment
S. Goldlücke, P.W. Schmitz / Journal of Economic Theory 150 (2014) 683–708 689iH is such that the low type’s payoff from choosing iH is equal to uc(θL). The probability that
has this property is
pHL = u
c(θH ) − uc(θL)
(θH − θL)v(iH ) . (8)
Following a low investment, the buyer offers θL. To make the buyer indifferent between the high
and the low offer following investment iH , the low type seller has to choose high investment with
probability
qLH = fH (1 − θH )
(θH − θL)fL . (9)
This value is smaller than one if and only if the pooling equilibrium does not exist. This insight,
that depending on the distribution there is either a pooling equilibrium or an equilibrium with
mixed strategies and partial pooling, remains valid in the general case.
Observation 1. In the two-type model, the pooling equilibrium becomes more likely the larger
the probability of the high type is, and the closer together the two types are. Moreover, increasing
the high type’s value, or even increasing the high and the low value by an equal amount, can turn
a pooling equilibrium into a semi-pooling equilibrium and thereby decrease the ex ante expected
payoff of the seller.
It is straightforward to embed the outside option signaling game into a full-fledged property
rights model, where the parties are symmetrically informed before date 1, when they can agree on
a simple ownership structure only. Giving the seller more property rights may then mean that θH
and θL are increased. Hence, Observation 1 implies that giving the seller more property rights can
be detrimental to his investment incentives, his expected payoff, and the expected total surplus,
which is in stark contrast to the standard property rights model under complete information.
4. Continuum of types
In this section, we let the type space Θ be an interval, Θ = [θL, θH ]. The seller’s type is drawn
from the distribution F with density f > 0, for which the derivative f ′ exists.
As in the case with only two types, a fully revealing equilibrium does not exist. The reason is
that in such an equilibrium, a type θ would be offered the share θ and accept. This type would
invest ic(θ) and get the payoff uc(θ) without taking his outside option. Since any other type that
deviates to ic(θ) would get the same payoff, and uc is increasing, lower types would have an
incentive to deviate. A separating equilibrium hence does not exist, but what about a pooling
equilibrium? Again as in the two-type case, the buyer will never offer a share greater than θH . If
the seller has the highest possible outside option θH , he chooses ic(θH ) with probability one. In
a pooling equilibrium all other types would have to do the same. However, types close to θH will
invest ic(θH ) only if the buyer offers the share θH of the surplus. Whether a pooling equilibrium
exists thus depends on the buyer’s expected revenue from offering θH compared to making any
other offer θ . With the definition
R(θ) = (1 − θ)F (θ), (10)
the expected revenue from offering θ is R(θ)v(ic(θH )), so that there is a pooling equilibrium if
and only if R(θH ) = maxθ R(θ). This already hints at the fact that the maximizer of the function
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result, we prove that this maximizer is uniquely defined.
Lemma 1. The function R has a unique maximizer, which is denoted by θ¯ , i.e.,
θ¯ = arg max
θ∈[θL,θH ]
R(θ). (11)
Moreover, R is weakly increasing on [θL, θ¯ ], and decreasing and strictly concave on [θ¯ , θH ].
The function R captures the tradeoff that the buyer faces, which is the tradeoff between a
higher acceptance probability and a larger share of the surplus in case of acceptance. That R is
increasing up to θ¯ implies that if in an equilibrium all types θ  θ¯ choose the same strategy, they
will be offered a share of at least θ¯ (which they accept). This is the case in the equilibrium of the
outside option signaling game that we state in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. An equilibrium of the outside option signaling game is given by
Pi(θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0, θ < θ¯,
v(ic(θ))
v(i)
, θ¯  θ < θc(i),
1, θc(i) θ
(12)
and
Q(i|θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0, i < ic(θ),
1 − (1−θc(i))2f (θc(i))
(1−θ)2f (θ) , i
c(θ) i < ic(θH ),
1, ic(θH ) i
(13)
for all θ  θ¯ , and Q(i|θ) = Q(i|θ¯ ) for all θ < θ¯ .
We see that as in the two-type case, the seller tries to mimic higher types, never lower ones.
The highest seller type chooses his complete information investment with probability 1. Any type
θ between θ¯ and θH mixes between all investments in the interval [ic(θ), ic(θH )], and chooses
ic(θH ) with positive probability if θH < 1. A type θ < θ¯ invests in the same way as the type θ¯ , so
that investments lower than ic(θ¯ ) never occur in equilibrium. Following this lowest investment
ic(θ¯ ), the buyer makes the offer θ¯ that is always accepted. For larger investments i, the buyer
mixes between offers in the interval [θ¯ , θc(i)] with an atom at θ¯ , and thereby sometimes makes
an offer that the seller does not accept.
While this result does not say that the described equilibrium is the unique outcome of the
game, we show uniqueness for a finite type space in Section 6. More precisely, we show there
that with a finite type space, all equilibria must lead to the same payoffs and distribution of
investment. If the finite type space is understood as a partition of the interval [θL, θH ] and all
functions of the finite type space are interpreted as step functions on this interval, then the func-
tions defined in Proposition 1 are limits of sequences of such equilibrium step functions as the
partition becomes arbitrarily fine.
With the explicit solution of the signaling game described in Proposition 1, we can write
down the parties’ payoffs and compare them to the complete information case, in which the
outside option is common knowledge from the start. This case was solved as a preliminary
in Section 2. First, note that in the outside option signaling equilibrium, each type of seller
chooses a weakly higher investment level than under complete information. The unconditional
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This table shows the (rounded) buyer’s payoff and the joint surplus in the signaling equilibrium (V ∗ and V ∗ + U∗)
as well as the same quantities for complete information (V c and V c + Uc) for the specification v(i) = i, c(i) = 12 i2,
Θ = [0,1] and f (θ) as indicated in the first column. To apply our results for the different distributions, we can either
show that Assumption 2 (log-concavity) holds, or show directly that the conditions in Lemma 1 hold.
f (θ) V ∗ V ∗ + U∗ V c V c + Uc
3(1−θ)
4
√
θ
0.22 0.29 0.11 0.16
1 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.33
6θ(1 − θ) 0.18 0.39 0.2 0.35
30θ4(1 − θ) 0.11 0.44 0.18 0.45
cumulative distribution function of investments is equal to max(0,−R′ ◦ θc) for i < ic(θH ), and
equal to 1 at i = ic(θH ). Since −R′(θ) = F(θ)− (1 − θ)f (θ), this function first order stochasti-
cally dominates the distribution of investments under complete information. However, unless the
equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium (θ¯ = θH ), there is also a positive probability of inefficient
separation in the signaling equilibrium, and therefore we cannot conclude that the asymmetry of
information in the signaling game in general leads to a higher joint surplus. Similarly, it is not
possible to say anything general about the buyer’s surplus in the outside option signaling game,
which is equal to
V ∗ =
θH∫
θ¯
−R′′(θ)(1 − θ)v(ic(θ))dθ + (1 − θH )2f (θH )v(ic(θH )), (14)
compared to the buyer’s surplus under complete information, which is equal to V c = E[(1 −
θ)v(ic(θ))].
We can, however, say something about the seller’s payoff. In the outside option signaling
game, a seller with outside option θ gets uc(max(θ, θ¯ )), i.e., the seller’s ex ante expected profit
is
U∗ = F(θ¯)uc(θ¯ ) +
θH∫
θ¯
uc(θ) dF (θ). (15)
This is larger than the seller’s expected payoff under complete information, which is Uc =
E[uc(θ)].
To illustrate that the buyer’s payoff and the joint payoff in the signaling equilibrium can be
larger or smaller than the corresponding payoffs under complete information, Table 1 shows these
values in four examples that differ with respect to the distribution of types. With a uniform dis-
tribution, the buyer’s payoff happens to be equalized in the two regimes. A pdf f (θ) = 6θ(1− θ)
puts more weight on intermediate types, which is beneficial for the buyer, who has to give up a
large share of the surplus to a high type seller and suffers from the low investment of low type
sellers. This advantage bears out to a larger extent under complete information than under sig-
naling. A pdf f (θ) = 3(1 − θ)/4√θ puts more weight on lower types. Since lower types invest
very little under complete information, here the signaling equilibrium, in which low types are
encouraged to invest, implies a larger payoff for the buyer.
We can also compare the seller’s payoff in the signaling game to other scenarios regarding
the distribution of information and timing. Consider first a scenario in which the outside option
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In this case, there are no ex post information rents since the buyer’s offer equals the true value
of the outside option, and at the same time the seller cannot tailor his investment decision to the
outside option. Instead, he maximizes his expected payoff E[θ ]v(i)−c(i) over i. With the result-
ing payoff uc(E[θ ]), the seller is worse off than he would be even in the complete information
case.
We can also compare our results to a timing as in [19], in which the seller (and only the
seller) learns the outside option once the investment is sunk. In this case, there is no signaling
motive, and the seller’s choice of investment is independent of his type. Consequently, the buyer
makes an offer of θ¯ and the seller invests ic(E[max(θ, θ¯ )]). While the investment is higher than
in the scenario above, it is not always put to its best use, as all types above θ¯ reject the offer.
The seller gets uc(E[max(θ¯ , θ)]) which is more than in the previous case, as he enjoys some
information rents. Nevertheless, the seller is still better off in the signaling equilibrium, which
allows him to both tailor the investment to the outside option and earn some information rents.
Since of all the possible scenarios, the seller’s payoff is highest in the signaling equilibrium, he
would influence the timing or information distribution in the direction of the signaling structure
whenever possible. This is summarized in the following observation.
Observation 2. The seller has an incentive to learn the outside option early and let it be known
that he knows about his outside option.
Finally, we can now revisit the question of the effect of giving the seller more property rights,
which we think of as a first order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of outside op-
tions. First, we consider only the change in the cut-off value that results from a change in the
distribution function. If θ¯ increases, then all types with an outside option smaller than the cut-off
value, who get uc(θ¯), are strictly better off. Types larger than the new cut-off value get the same
payoff uc(θ) as before.
Observation 3. If the cut-off value θ¯ increases, each seller type is weakly better off. If a first
order stochastic dominance shift of the distribution of outside options increases the cut-off value,
then it also increases the seller’s ex ante payoff.
This observation tells us that if sellers come from two different populations with distribution
of types F and F˜ , respectively, where F˜ first order stochastically dominates F , then if the cut-off
value is higher under F˜ than under F , the seller’s ex ante payoff must be higher under F˜ than
under F . This means that if there is some observable characteristic that implies a higher outside
option on average, then low types can benefit from belonging to this group as they can hide
behind the better average bargaining position in their group and get a good offer.
Recall how in the case with only two types in Section 3 a decrease in θ¯ , which meant a change
from a pooling to a semi-pooling equilibrium, could easily happen with first order stochastic
dominance shifts in the distribution. While this same effect can still be constructed here, by
removing some mass at types slightly lower than θ¯ and adding it to types slightly larger than θ¯ ,
it now seems more likely that more property rights would increase θ¯ and make the seller better
off. For example, if F is a uniform distribution on an interval [a, b], then θ¯ = min(b, a+12 ). If we
increase a or b, then θ¯ also increases.
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In the game that is studied in the main part of this paper, all the buyer can do is to make
a take-it-or-leave-it offer based on her updated beliefs. This is optimal for her from an ex post
perspective, but not necessarily from an ex ante perspective. In this section, we explore the con-
sequences of full commitment and ask what would happen if the buyer could offer a binding
contract conditional on investment before the seller moves. We maintain the assumption that the
seller’s type is not observable, and characterize the optimal screening contract.
We use the revelation principle and let a general contract be a map from types into outcomes
that satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints of each type of seller telling the truth. In addi-
tion, the buyer has to take into account that the seller can take his outside option. All that matters
for truth telling and participation of the seller is his expected payoff following his announcement.
Therefore, it is sufficient to focus on contracts of the form (t (θ), i(θ), x(θ)), where t (θ) is an
unconditional payment from the seller to the buyer that an announced type θ is required to make,
i(θ) is the required investment, and x(θ) the probability of separation. We first allow for two dif-
ferent points in time when separation can occur and let x(θ) = (x1(θ), x2(θ)), where x1(θ) is the
probability of separation before the investment is made, and x2(θ) is the probability of separation
after the investment is made. Hence, first the seller makes the payment t (θ), then with probability
x1(θ), the relationship ends directly after the seller has made his payment, leaving the seller with
payoff uc(θ)− t (θ). While we allow the possibility of such an early break-up of the relationship,
in an optimal contract it will be true that x1(θ) = 0. With probability 1 − x1(θ), the seller makes
the investment i(θ), and then with probability 1 − x2(θ), buyer and seller collaborate and the
seller gets the whole ex post surplus v(i(θ)). There is no loss of generality in assuming this form
of contracts, since all payoff transfers from the seller to the buyer can be handled by the payment
t (θ). Given such a contract, the expected payoff of a seller of type θ who pretends to be of type
θ˜ is (
1 − x1(θ˜)
)(
S
(
i(θ˜ )
)− x2(θ˜)(1 − θ)v(i(θ˜ )))+ x1(θ˜ )uc(θ) − t (θ˜ ), (16)
where the definition S(i) = v(i) − c(i) was used. A truth-telling seller gets the payoff
uS(θ) =
(
1 − x1(θ)
)(
S
(
i(θ)
)− x2(θ)(1 − θ)v(i(θ)))+ x1(θ)uc(θ) − t (θ). (17)
The buyer’s optimization problem is the following:
max
θH∫
θL
t (y) dF (y) (18)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
uS(θ) uS(θ˜) +
(
1 − x1(θ˜ )
)
(θ − θ˜ )x2(θ˜)v
(
i(θ˜ )
)+ x1(θ˜ )(uc(θ) − uc(θ˜)) (IC)
and the individual rationality constraint
uS(θ) uc(θ), (IR)
which have to hold for all θ, θ˜ ∈ [θL, θH ].
We will show next that an optimal contract will specify the first best investment level ic(1)
and x1(θ) = 0. To see this, consider any contract (t (θ), i(θ), x(θ)). We then define the contract
(t˜(θ), i˜(θ), x˜(θ)) as
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i˜(θ) = ic(1), (20)
x˜1(θ) = 0, and (21)
x˜2(θ) = x1(θ)v(i
c(θ))
v(ic(1))
+ (1 − x1(θ))x2(θ) v(i(θ))
v(ic(1))
∈ [0,1]. (22)
With this new contract, a truth telling seller’s payoff is S(ic(1)) − x˜2(θ)(1 − θ)v(ic(1)) − t˜ (θ),
which is equal to uS(θ) under the old contract. Hence, the individual rationality constraint (IR)
is satisfied also for the new contract. The incentive constraint (IC) now reads
uS(θ) uS(θ˜) + (θ − θ˜ )x˜2(θ˜)v
(
ic(1)
)
= uS(θ˜) +
(
1 − x1(θ˜)
)
(θ − θ˜ )x2(θ˜)v
(
i(θ˜ )
)+ x1(θ˜)(θ − θ˜ )v(ic(θ˜ )). (23)
Because uc(θ) is a convex function with derivative v(ic(θ)), it follows from the old contract’s
incentive constraint that this constraint is satisfied as well. Moreover, this new contract generates
higher expected profit for the buyer because t˜ (θ) t (θ). Thus, we have shown that i(θ) = ic(1)
and x1(θ) = 0. In order to find the buyer’s optimal separation probabilities x2(θ) and corre-
sponding payments t (θ), where a higher separation probability corresponds to a lower up-front
payment, we use standard tools from mechanism design and the literature on type-dependent
outside option.12 In this literature, the difficulty mostly lies in finding out for which types the
individual rationality constraint binds. Here, the proof of the following proposition shows that
the IR constraint is binding for the whole interval of types that are larger than the cut-off value θ¯ .
Proposition 2. An optimal screening contract specifies the investment level ic(1). Sellers of type
θ  θ¯ choose to collaborate ex post with probability 1 and pay t (θ) = S(ic(1))−uc(θ¯) up-front,
which leaves them with a payoff of uc(θ¯). Types θ > θ¯ separate with probability x2(θ) = v(ic(θ))v(ic(1))
and pay up-front t (θ) = S(ic(1)) − S(ic(θ)). These seller types get the payoff uc(θ).
While every seller type receives the same payoff as in the signaling equilibrium, the buyer’s
expected payoff and the joint surplus are obviously higher than in the case without commitment.
Since now i is verifiable and a hold-up problem does not exist, it may seem intuitive that an opti-
mal contract specifies the investment ic(1) for all types: Since seller types differ only with respect
to the outside option, the screening device is the probability of separation, not the investment.
But if the asset is used outside the relationship with positive probability, then the value ic(1) is
not the optimal investment. Instead, the optimal investment for type θ is ic(1 − x2(θ)+ x2(θ)θ).
Observation 4. Any type θ in the open interval (θ¯ ,1) overinvests: given that the separation
probability x2(θ) is positive for these types, the efficient investment ic(1 − (1 − θ)x2(θ)) is
strictly smaller than ic(1).
Note that an overinvestment effect is also present in the signaling model, where it counteracts
the hold-up effect on investment. With contractible investments, the hold-up problem is absent
and only the overinvestment effect is present.
12 See e.g. [11] for a very general treatment, which nevertheless does not encompass our model as a special case.
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In this section, we analyze the outside option signaling game with Θ = {θ1, . . . , θH } where
0 θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θH < 1.13 We use the shortcut ik = ic(θk). Let (P,Q) be a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the outside option signaling game. In the following, we will derive properties of
(P,Q), in order to eventually arrive at a characterization of all equilibrium outcomes. Let I∗ be
the set of investments that are chosen with positive probability in the equilibrium (P,Q), and let
Θ∗(i) denote the set of all types that choose i ∈ I∗ with positive probability. We denote by u∗(θ)
the equilibrium payoff received by a seller of type θ , so that with this notation we have for all
i ∈ I∗ and θ ∈ Θ∗(i) that u∗(θ) = U(P, i, θ).
Note first that u∗(θ) uc(θ), because a type θ can always guarantee himself the payoff uc(θ)
independent of the buyer’s behavior, by investing ic(θ) and taking his outside option. Similarly,
because the seller’s payoff is weakly increasing in θ for all offers and investments, U(P, i, θ)
and u∗(θ) are weakly increasing in θ . A higher type could always play a lower type’s strategy
and get at least the same payoff as that type.
In the following, we will first show (Lemma 2) that if an investment i occurs at all in equilib-
rium, then it is chosen with positive probability by the type θc(i) that chooses i under symmetric
information, and by none of the higher types. Then, in Lemma 3, we show that investing i is op-
timal for all lower types, i.e. those between θ1 and θc(i). Finally, in Proposition 3 we will answer
the question which investments will be chosen in equilibrium. The reader who is not interested
in the proofs may skip the lemmas leading to Proposition 3, which contains the main result of
this section.
Lemma 2. For all i ∈ I∗ it holds that θc(i) = maxΘ∗(i).
In particular, only investments in the set {i1, . . . , iH } are chosen at all. We can use the one-to-
one relationship between θk and ik and express everything in types. This highlights that in this
model types are distinguishable by their investment in the complete information case. We can
also identify the buyer’s offer with the type that just accepts it, and then write the equilibrium
strategies as matrices P and Q. An entry pkl in the matrix P stands for the probability of offer θl
when investment ik is observed, and an entry qkl in Q is the probability of type k investing il , or
“mimicking” type l. Since we have shown that in any equilibrium the mixed strategy of type θk
has support in {ik, . . . , iH } and the buyer’s random offer following investment ik takes on values
in {θ1, . . . , θk}, equilibrium strategies P and Q are triangular matrices. Equilibrium conditions for
strategies (P,Q) in matrix form then look as follows:
• qkl > 0 implies that
l ∈ arg max
m
v(im)
m∑
j=1
pmj max(θj , θk) − c(im), (24)
13 The assumption θH < 1 is made for simplicity. We could easily add types θ  1 who would always invest ic(θ) and
get no acceptable offer from the buyer. That is, a type θ  1 seller would neither mimic other types nor be mimicked
himself.
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Some notation for the finite type case.
uc(θk) maxi v(i)θk − c(i)
ik = ic(θk) arg maxi v(i)θk − c(i)
θc inverse of ic
qkl probability that type θk chooses investment il
plk probability that offer is θk when investment is il
Pil (θk) probability that offer is  θk when investment is il
Q(il |θk) probability that type θk’s investment is  il
u∗(θk) type θk’s payoff in the equilibrium (P,Q)
Θ∗(il ) set of all types θk with qkl > 0
I∗ set of all investments il with qkl > 0 for some k
• for each l with il ∈ I∗, plj > 0 implies that
j ∈ arg max
m
(1 − θm)
m∑
k=1
fkqkl. (25)
This notation is summarized in Table 2. We will show next that a given type θk’s set of best
responses to the buyer’s strategy P includes all investments that are greater than or equal to ik
and are chosen at all in the equilibrium. In other words, if an investment ik is chosen at all, then
it is the optimal choice for every type not greater than the corresponding type θk .
Lemma 3. For all ik ∈ I∗ it holds that U(P, ik, θ) = u∗(θ) for all θ = θ1, . . . , θk .
We have shown so far that, while there may be investments that do not occur at all in equilib-
rium, every investment that does occur is chosen by the type that would invest the same amount
with symmetric information. Furthermore, all lower types’ payoff from choosing this investment
equals their equilibrium payoff. In order to be consistent with this structure, the buyer’s strategy
must induce all these indifferences. This observation gives rise to the following lemma.
Lemma 4. For all k and im ∈ I∗ with m > k it holds that
Pim(θk)v(im) =
u∗(θk+1) − u∗(θk)
θk+1 − θk . (26)
Moreover, for all im, ik ∈ I∗ with m k it holds that pmk > 0.
Now that we have some idea about the offers that the buyer must be willing to make, we turn
to a description of the buyer’s behavior, in order to pin down the seller’s equilibrium strategy. As
in the continuous case, the function R(θ) = (1 − θ)F (θ) plays a role here. Similar to Lemma 1
it can be shown here that if we define
k¯ = max{k ∈ {1, . . . ,H }: R(θk)R(θk−1)}, (27)
the function R is weakly increasing on {θ1, . . . , θk¯}, strictly decreasing on {θk¯, . . . , θH }, and the
linear interpolation of the points (θ ¯,R(θ ¯)), . . . , (θH ,R(θH )) is concave.k k
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Then R(θ) describes the buyer’s expected share of the surplus if she makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer of θ . The maximum θk¯ of this function is the offer that she would make in a pooling equilib-
rium. Can a pooling equilibrium exist? Since the highest type θH chooses iH in any equilibrium,
if all types pool on the same investment, it must be on iH . It follows that there is such a pooling
equilibrium if and only if θk¯ = θH . Moreover, this suggests that in any equilibrium, pooling is
only possible for types lower than θk¯ . Since a separating type could easily be mimicked by a
lower type, equilibria must typically be in mixed strategies.
Proposition 3. Any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the outside option signaling game must have
the following form: No investment below ik¯ is chosen. A type θk with k  k¯ mixes between all
investments in {ik, . . . , iH }, with expected payoff equal to uc(θk). All types θk with k < k¯ mix over
{ik¯, . . . , iH } with payoff uc(θk¯). When observing investment ik , the buyer mixes between offers in{θk¯, . . . , θk}, and her expected payoff from any such offer is (1 − θk)v(ik).
This result is a uniqueness result in the sense that in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
game, payoffs of the buyer and the seller are uniquely determined. Refinements to pin down
beliefs following zero probability events are not needed for this result. This is unusual for a
signaling game and is due to the special structure of this game, in which the buyer’s offers only
matter to a limited extent for the seller’s payoff. Equilibrium investment in fact turns out to be
a poor signal for a high outside option. The types that pool never reveal their outside options,
and the others do not improve their payoff in the signaling game compared to what they could
get independent of the buyer. These higher types separate in the sense that they choose different
strategies. Because of the randomization, however, a chosen investment does not give away the
type ex post. An observed investment could have been chosen by any type who would invest
weakly less under complete information.
From all the indifference conditions that have to be met in an equilibrium we are able to obtain
an equilibrium candidate. Combining Proposition 3 and Lemma 4 yields for all k  k¯ and m > k
Pim(θk) =
uc(θk+1) − uc(θk)
(θk+1 − θk)v(im) and Pik (θk) = 1, (28)
as well as for k < k¯
Pim(θk) = 0. (29)
For the definition of the seller’s strategy, we assume that all types j < k¯ pool on type k¯’s strategy:
qjk = qk¯k for all j < k¯. (30)
Let us further define λk = fk(1−θk)(1−θk−1)θk−θk−1 and λH+1 = 0 and
qk¯k =
λk − λk+1
R(θk¯)
for all k > k¯, (31)
qk¯k¯ = 1 −
λk¯+1
R(θk¯)
, (32)
qjk = λk − λk+1
λj
, k  j > k¯. (33)
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equilibrium of the outside option signaling game.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced ex ante private information about an agent’s reservation
value in the kind of hold-up problem that is at the center of the literature started by Grossman
and Hart’s [4] seminal work on the pros and cons of vertical integration. The resulting outside
option signaling game has interesting features which make it quite distinct from other signaling
models. The simplicity of the model allows us to fully characterize the resulting equilibrium
payoffs, which are uniquely determined. The equilibrium involves pooling up to a certain type
of outside option, such that all lower types get the same payoff and because they accept all
offers in equilibrium, these types are not distinguishable, even ex post. Higher types follow a
mixed strategy and on average obtain the same payoff as with complete information. The fact
that the seller randomizes between investment levels reflects that there is a strong force against a
separating equilibrium in this model: If an investment is only chosen by high types and triggers
high offers, this investment becomes attractive for lower types as well.
In the outside option signaling game, there is a gap between the chosen investment and the
investment that would result if the seller would get the full return to his investment. We have
shown that this gap vanishes if investment is verifiable. This gap would also shrink if the seller
had greater bargaining power than in the game that was analyzed. For example, if the bargaining
game was modeled as the seller making a take-it-or-leave-it offer with probability α and the
buyer only with probability 1 − α, then a higher α would increase the surplus and the seller’s
payoff. Although it is standard in principal–agent models to assume take-it-or-leave-it offers by
the principal, it would be interesting to allow for more complex bargaining games at the ex post
stage. While the results should be the same if the buyer was able to make repeated offers, results
are likely to change and become difficult to obtain if both players made offers.
Our model of a one-shot buyer–seller interaction makes the prediction of higher rates of sep-
aration when relationship-specific investment is higher. Two kinds of relationships can arise:
Stable relationships that are characterized by low investments and low profits (θ  θ¯ ), and un-
stable relationships that are characterized by high investment and high separation rates (θ > θ¯ ).
However, there are ways in which the parties might try to mitigate the hold-up problem, say by
establishing repeated interactions, and these factors could lead to a positive instead of a neg-
ative correlation between the stability of the relationship and the level of investment. It might
therefore be interesting to extend the analysis to take into account dynamic considerations and/or
competition between buyers.
There are a couple of other extensions of the model that are promising. One interesting task
for future research is to allow the payoff that the buyer gets when the seller takes the outside
option to depend on the seller’s type. This might admit an even greater set of applications, for
instance the interpretation of the outside option as suing for payment, with private information
about the probability of winning.14 Another possible avenue for future research is to focus on
the case of pure rent-seeking, in which the investment increases the outside value but is of little
use inside the relationship. Investment can then still be used as a signal for profitable outside
opportunities, but higher investment is no longer more efficient.
14 See [1] for a related model in the context of pretrial bargaining and investment in trial preparation.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. To show that this property of R follows from log-concavity of F , we show
first that wherever R is convex, it must be strictly increasing:
R′′(θ) 0 ⇒ R′(θ) > 0. (34)
The first derivative of R is
R′(θ) = (1 − θ)f (θ) − F(θ), (35)
and the second derivative is
R′′(θ) = (1 − θ)f ′(θ) − 2f (θ). (36)
Assume now that R′′(θ)  0. This implies that f ′(θ) > 0 and (1 − θ)  2f (θ)
f ′(θ) . Because log-
concavity means F(θ)f ′(θ) f (θ)2 we also have
R′(θ) 2f (θ)
2 − F(θ)f ′(θ)
f ′(θ)
 f (θ)
2
f ′(θ)
> 0. (37)
Hence, we have shown that property (34) holds. This property implies that the function R can
have no interior minimum (i.e., no point with R′(θ) = 0 and R′′(θ)  0). We also know that
R is nonnegative with R(θL) = 0. Therefore, the global maximum at θ¯ is also the unique local
maximum. The function R is weakly increasing up to the point θ¯ and weakly decreasing for all
θ  θ¯ . Because R′(θ) 0 for all θ  θ¯ , it follows again from property (34) that the function R
is strictly concave on that range. 
Proof of Proposition 1. In the first step, we show that the functions Pi and Q(.|θ) are indeed
distribution functions. The function Pi has Pi(θ) = 0 for all θL  θ < θ¯ and Pi(θ) = 1 for all
θ  θc(i). It is nondecreasing inbetween because v ◦ ic is increasing. Similarly, the function
Q(.|θ) has Q(i|θ) = 0 for all i < ic(θ¯) and Q(ic(θH )|θ) = 1. It is nondecreasing because θc is
increasing in i and the derivative
∂
∂y
(
1 − (1 − y)
2f (y)
(1 − θ)2f (θ)
)
= − (1 − y)R
′′(y)
(1 − θ)2f (θ) (38)
is positive on the relevant range, since R is concave on the interval [θ¯ , θH ].
As a second step, we show that Pi(θ) = 1 for all θ  θc(i) is part of the buyer’s best response
to a seller strategy with Q(i|θ) = 0 for all i < ic(θ), and vice versa: If an investment i is never
chosen by a seller of type higher than θc(i), the buyer optimally never offers more than θc(i)
when observing i. Conversely, because the buyer, when observing an investment i, never offers
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the investment ic(θ) over i.
In the third step we show that all investments in the support of Q(.|θ) are best replies to the
buyer’s strategy. First we look at a seller of type θ  θ¯ . Such a seller’s expected payoff from
choosing an investment ic(θH ) i  ic(θ) is
v(i)
∫
max(θ, y) dPi(y) − c(i), (39)
which is the same as
v(i)
(
θPi(θ) +
∫
(θ,θc(i)]
y dPi(y)
)
− c(i). (40)
Because Pi is continuous on the interval [θ, θc(i)] we can use integration by parts to evaluate
this integral as
v(i)
(
θPi(θ) + θc(i)Pi
(
θc(i)
)− θPi(θ) −
θc(i)∫
θ
Pi(y) dy
)
− c(i), (41)
which is equal to
v(i)θc(i) −
θc(i)∫
θ
v
(
ic(y)
)
dy − c(i). (42)
Since v(i)θc(i)−c(i) = uc(θc(i)) and since the derivative of uc is v◦ic, this is the same as uc(θ).
Hence, a seller of type θ  θ¯ in expectation gets his complete information payoff following any
investment i ∈ [ic(θ), ic(θH )].
Next, we consider seller types in the interval [θL, θ¯ ]. Since Pi(θ) = 0 for all θ < θ¯ , i.e., the
buyer never makes an offer that is smaller than θ¯ , all types in this interval accept all offers and
therefore they all have the same expected payoff following any investment they choose. Like the
type θ¯ , seller types in this interval are indifferent between investments in [ic(θ¯ ), ic(θH )].
As the last step, it remains to show that all offers in the support of Pi are best responses to
the mixed strategy of the seller. Using Bayes’ Law, this means that we have to show that for all
θ¯  θ  θc(i) it holds that
(1 − θ)
∫ θ
θL
q(i|y)f (y) dy∫ θc(i)
θL
q(i|y)f (y) dy
= 1 − θc(i), (43)
where q(i|θ) denotes the probability of investment i given type θ (or the density at that point).
Since q(i|θ) = q(i|θ¯ ) for all θ  θ¯ the claim in (43) is equivalent to
(1 − θ)
(
F(θ¯)q(i|θ¯ ) +
θ∫
θ¯
q(i|y)f (y) dy
)
= (1 − θc(i))
(
F(θ¯)q(i|θ¯ ) +
θc(i)∫
q(i|y)f (y) dy
)
. (44)θ¯
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a fraction with the same denominator and a numerator that only depends on i but not on θ . The
numerator thus cancels out and the claim in (43) is equivalent to
(1 − θ)
(
F(θ¯)
(1 − θ¯ )2f (θ¯) +
θ∫
θ¯
1
(1 − y)2 dy
)
= (1 − θc(i))
(
F(θ¯)
(1 − θ¯ )2f (θ¯) +
θc(i)∫
θ¯
1
(1 − y)2 dy
)
. (45)
Since θ¯ maximizes R it holds that (1 − θ¯ )f (θ¯) = F(θ¯) (see Eq. (35)). Consequently, the claim
in (43) is equivalent to
(1 − θ)
(
1
1 − θ¯ +
1
1 − θ −
1
1 − θ¯
)
= (1 − θc(i))( 1
1 − θ¯ +
1
1 − θc(i) −
1
1 − θ¯
)
, (46)
which is true. 
Proof of Proposition 2. For any x2 : [θL, θH ] → [0,1] that is part of an incentive compatible
contract, let θ0 ∈ Θ be the supremum of all types with x2(θ) = 0. The IC constraints then imply
that uS(θ) = uS(θ0) for all types θ  θ0. In the buyer’s optimal contract it will then hold that
x2(θ) = 0 and t (θ) = S(ic(1)) − uc(θ0) for all θ  θ0. We therefore now take such a threshold
θ0 as given. Following standard methods of finding an optimal screening contract we replace the
IC constraints by the requirement that x2 is nondecreasing and
uS(θ) = v
(
ic(1)
) θ∫
θ0
x2(y) dy + uc
(
θ0
)
. (47)
We then define a set of candidate functions as X0 := {x2 : [θ0, θH ] → [0,1], nondecreasing} and
write the problem as
max
x∈X0
S
(
ic(1)
)− uc(θ0)−
θH∫
θ0
(
R′(θ) + 1)x2(θ)v(ic(1))dθ (48)
s.t.
θ∫
θ0
x2(y) − v(i
c(y))
v(ic(1))
dy  0. (49)
Because R′(θ) = (1 − θ)f (θ) − F(θ)−1, the probability x2(θ) must be as small as possible.
This suggests that IR should bind everywhere, which would imply that the optimal x2 is
x2(θ) = v(i
c(θ))
v(ic(1))
, (50)
which is indeed increasing. Therefore, once we have shown that the IR constraint is binding
everywhere, we have found the solution to the optimization problem. To do this, note first that
because the objective function in (48) can also be written as
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(
ic(1)
)− uS(θH ) −
θH∫
θ0
R′(θ)x2(θ)v
(
ic(1)
)
dθ (51)
and because R′(θ) > 0 for all θ < θ¯ it follows that θ0  θ¯ . Furthermore, for the part that depends
on x we can use integration by parts to get
uS(θH ) +
θH∫
θ0
R′(θ)x2(θ)v
(
ic(1)
)
dθ
= (1 − θH )f (θH )uS(θH ) − R′
(
θ0
)
uc
(
θ0
)−
θH∫
θ0
R′′(θ)uS(θ) dθ
 (1 − θH )f (θH )uc(θH ) − R′
(
θ0
)
uc
(
θ0
)−
θH∫
θ0
R′′(θ)uc(θ) dθ
= uc(θH ) +
θH∫
θ0
R′(θ)v
(
ic(θ)
)
dθ. (52)
This shows that the objective function is maximized at the function x defined in Eq. (50).
Finally, we find the optimal θ0: Solving
max
θ0
S
(
ic(1)
)− uc(θ0)−
θH∫
θ0
(
R′(θ) + 1)v(ic(θ))dθ (53)
yields θ¯ as the optimal cut-off value. 
Proof of Lemma 2. When the buyer observes an investment i ∈ I∗, she updates that the seller
must have an outside option in Θ∗(i). The share she offers will therefore also lie in Θ∗(i) ⊂
{θ1, . . . , θH }, and it will never be more than the highest possible type would accept, i.e., the offer
is not higher than θm = maxΘ∗(i). The profit received by type θm from choosing i is therefore
equal to θmv(i) − c(i), which would be strictly smaller than uc(θm) if i = im. Therefore i = im,
which is the same as θc(i) = θm. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Let ik ∈ I∗. From Lemma 2 we know already that U(P, ik, θk) = u∗(θk).
First, we show that the equality also holds for the lowest type, i.e. that U(P, ik, θ1) = u∗(θ1). To
this end, let θl be the lowest type with this property, i.e., U(P, ik, θl) = u∗(θl) and U(P, ik, θ) <
u∗(θ) for all θ < θl . Since no type below θl chooses ik , the offer following it cannot be lower
than θl . This implies that every lower type would get the same payoff as type θl when investing ik :
U(P, ik, θl) = v(ik)
∫
odPik (o) − c(ik) = U(P, ik, θ) for all θ  θl. (54)
Payoff monotonicity then implies that U(P, ik, θ) = u∗(θ) for any type θ  θl , hence l = 1.
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to P can be found by maximizing Pi(θl)v(i) over all i ∈ I∗. More precisely, we claim that for all
l  1
arg max
i∈I∗ U(P, i, θl+1) = arg maxi∈I∗ Pi(θl)v(i) ⊂ arg maxi∈I∗ U(P, i, θl). (55)
If this claim is true it verifies the lemma, since it implies that
ik ∈ arg max
i∈I∗ U(P, i, θk) ⊂ · · · ⊂ arg maxi∈I∗ U(P, i, θ1). (56)
It remains to prove the claim, which we will do by induction. For l = 1 we have that
arg max
i∈I∗ U(P, i, θ1) = I
∗ (57)
and for all i ∈ I∗
U(P, i, θ2) = u∗(θ1) + (θ2 − θ1)Pi(θ1)v(i). (58)
This expression is maximized over i whenever Pi(θ1)v(i) is maximized.
Assume now that the claim is true for l 1. We will show that it also holds for l + 1. Consider
first investments in the set I′ = arg maxi∈I∗ U(P, i, θl+1). For all i ∈ I′ it holds that type θl+2’s
payoff is
U(P, i, θl+2) = u∗(θl+1) + (θl+2 − θl+1)Pi(θl+1)v(i), (59)
and hence
arg max
i∈I′
U(P, i, θl+2) = arg max
i∈I′
Pi(θl+1)v(i). (60)
In case that I′ = I∗, we are done, so assume now that the set I∗ \ I′ is nonempty. Investments
i ∈ I∗ \ I′ are not chosen by type θl+1, which means that the buyer will not make the offer
θl+1 and thus Pi(θl+1)v(i) = Pi(θl)v(i). Using the induction hypothesis, we have that for any
i ∈ I∗ \ I′ and i′ ∈ I′
Pi(θl+1)v(i) = Pi(θl)v(i) < Pi′(θl)v
(
i′
)
 Pi′(θl+1)v
(
i′
)
. (61)
This means that investment levels in I∗ \ I′ do not maximize Pi(θl+1)v(i) and therefore
arg max
i∈I∗ Pi(θl+1)v(i) = arg maxi∈I′ Pi(θl+1)v(i). (62)
For all i ∈ I∗ \ I′ it holds for type θl+2’s payoff that
U(P, i, θl+2) < u∗(θl+1) + (θl+2 − θl+1)Pi(θl+1)v(i). (63)
Comparing this payoff to the payoff from investing i′ ∈ I′ (Eq. (59)), we can conclude that
arg max
i∈I∗ U(P, i, θl+2) = arg maxi∈I′ U(P, i, θl+2) ⊂ I
′. (64)
The claim now follows from (60), (64) and (62). 
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holds that U(P, im, θ) = u∗(θ) for all θ  θm, and hence for all k < m
u∗(θk+1) = u∗(θk) + (θk+1 − θk)Pim(θk)v(im). (65)
To show the second claim of the lemma, note first that for any type θk with ik ∈ I∗ it must be
true that pkk > 0, because else U(P, ik, θk−1) would be too low: if pkk = 0, this payoff would
be equal to
U(P, ik, θk−1) =
(
(1 − pkk)θk−1 + pkkθk
)
v(ik) − c(ik)
= θk−1v(ik) − c(ik) < uc(θk−1). (66)
Next, assume that for m > k as in the lemma we have pmk = 0. Then
0 = Pim(θk)v(im) − Pim(θk−1)v(im) =
u∗(θk+1) − uc(θk)
θk+1 − θk −
uc(θk) − u∗(θk−1)
θk − θk−1 , (67)
and hence
uc(θk) = u∗(θk+1) θk − θk−1
θk+1 − θk−1 + u
∗(θk−1)
θk+1 − θk
θk+1 − θk−1 . (68)
Since the function uc is strictly convex and
θk = θk+1 θk − θk−1
θk+1 − θk−1 + θk−1
θk+1 − θk
θk+1 − θk−1 , (69)
it must on the other hand be true that
uc(θk) < u
c(θk+1)
θk − θk−1
θk+1 − θk−1 + u
c(θk−1)
θk+1 − θk
θk+1 − θk−1 . (70)
Hence, we have found a contradiction to pmk = 0 and can conclude that pmk > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let ik ∈ I∗. When observing ik , the buyer’s expected profit from offering
θj is
(1 − θj )
∑j
l=1 flqlk∑k
l=1 flqlk
. (71)
We know from Lemma 4 that to be consistent with the seller’s behavior, the buyer has to offer all
θj with ij ∈ I∗, j  k with positive probability. Offering θk is consistent with profit maximization
if
k∑
l=1
flqlk(1 − θk)
j∑
l=1
flqlk(1 − θj ) for all j, (72)
and offering θj with positive probability is possible if this condition holds with equality. As a
first step, we collect all inequalities that define the buyer’s behavior in an equilibrium (P,Q).
We let
K := {k: ik ∈ I∗ \ {iH }} (73)
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have to account for the fact that Q is a stochastic matrix, i.e., that the row entries add up to one.
From (72) we get that the following condition must hold for all j , k with j  k and k ∈ K :
j∑
l=1
flqlk(θk − θj ) +
k∑
l=j+1
flqlk(θk − 1) 0, (74)
with equality if j ∈ K . Moreover, we have for all j  k ∈ K
qjk  0. (75)
In addition, we have the same condition for the highest investment iH :
j∑
l=1
flqlH (θH − θj ) +
H∑
l=1
flqlH (θH − 1) 0 (76)
for all j < H , with equality if j ∈ K . We also again have qjH  0 for all j  H . Plugging in
qlH = 1 −∑lk∈K qlk we get that for all j < H
j∑
l=1
∑
lk∈K
qlkfl(θj − θH ) +
H−1∑
l=j+1
∑
lk∈K
qlkfl(1 − θH )R(θH ) − R(θj ), (77)
with equality if j ∈ K , as well as
∑
jk∈K
qjk  1. (78)
We are going to treat the variables qjk as one big vector, denoted by q. The entries in q are
indexed by jk, k ∈ K , 1 j  k, hence q ∈Rn with n =∑k∈K k. Similarly, we define a vector
μjk ∈ Rn by μjklk = fl(θk − θj ) for all l  j and μjklk = fl(θk − 1) for all l > j and zero else.
Furthermore, we define a vector μj by μjlk = fl(θj − θH ) for all l  j and μjlk = fl(1 − θH ) for
all l > j . Last, let 1j denote a vector with 1jjk = 1 for j  k ∈ K and 0 else; and let ejk be a
vector with ejkjk = 1 and 0 else.
With these definitions, our inequalities (75), (78), (74), (77) read
−ejkq 0, 1 j  k, k ∈ K, (79)
1jq 1, j = 1, . . . ,H − 1, (80)
μjkq 0, for all k ∈ K, j < k and also  0 for j ∈ K, (81)
μjqR(θH ) − R(θj ), j < H and also  0 for j ∈ K. (82)
If the entries qjk of the vector q are part of an equilibrium, then q constitutes a solution of this
system of inequalities. As the next step in the proof, we find a system of inequalities that is an
alternative of this system, i.e., we find a system that has no solution if and only if this one has a
solution. We use Theorem 22.1 in [18] to get the following alternative system:
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j=1
βj +
H−1∑
l=1
δl
(
R(θH ) − R(θl)
)
< 0, (83)
H−1∑
j=1
1jβj +
∑
jk
μjkγjk +
H−1∑
l=1
μlδl  0, (84)
where we are looking for coefficients βj  0, j = 1, . . . ,H − 1, γjk ( 0 if j /∈ K), and
δl ( 0 if l /∈ K). That is, if there exists an equilibrium of the signaling game, then there are
no such β , γ , δ that satisfy inequalities (83) and (84). Note that (84) concerns the components of
a vector of dimension n. For the subsequent analysis, it is convenient to write this inequality as
an inequality in each coefficient jk with k ∈ K and j  k
βj +
j−1∑
i=1
γikfj (θk − 1) +
k−1∑
i=j
γikfj (θk − θi) +
j−1∑
l=1
δlfj (1 − θH )
+
H−1∑
l=j
δlfj (θl − θH ) 0. (85)
Let kˆ = minK . We claim that k¯ = kˆ and first show that R(θl) R(θkˆ) for all l < kˆ. Assume
not. Then we can construct a solution by setting δl = γlk = 1 and δkˆ = γkˆk = −1 for all k ∈ K
and all other coefficients equal to zero. Plugging in these values, the first inequality (83) reads
(R(θH )−R(θl))−(R(θH )−R(θkˆ)) < 0 and is satisfied because we assumed that R(θl) > R(θkˆ).
The value of the second inequality (85) depends on how kˆ and l compare to j and k, where due
to the definition of kˆ it holds that k  kˆ > l. This second inequality is equal to θk − 1 − θk + 1 +
1 − θH − 1 + θH  0 if j > kˆ, equal to θk − 1 − θk + θkˆ + 1 − θH + θH − θkˆ  0 if l < j  kˆ,
and θk − θl − θk + θkˆ − θH + θl + θH − θkˆ  0 if j  l. All of these simplify to 0 0.
Similarly, one can show that R(θ
kˆ+1)  R(θkˆ) is also necessarily true, because else there
would be a solution with δ
kˆ+1 = γkˆ+1k = 1 and δkˆ = γkˆk = −1. With these values, the first
inequality would read (R(θH ) − R(θkˆ+1)) − (R(θH ) − R(θkˆ)) < 0, which holds if R(θkˆ+1) >
R(θ
kˆ
). As above, the second inequality would be true with equality in all three cases (j > kˆ + 1,
kˆ < j  kˆ + 1, and j  kˆ). Hence, we have shown that kˆ = k¯.15
Next we show that K is an interval of consecutive numbers. Assume to the contrary that
there is a gap in K , i.e., that there exist l < m < h with m /∈ K , l = max{k ∈ K, k  m} and
h = min{k ∈ K, k  m}. There is a λ ∈ (0,1) with (1 − λ)θh + λθl = θm. Define δl = γlk =
−λ, δm = γmk = 1, δh = γhk = −(1 − λ) for all relevant k ∈ K . Then the first condition holds
because R is concave on K : λR(θl) + (1 − λ)R(θh) − R(θm) < 0. That the second condition
always holds with equality is seen immediately if k  l, for which this condition takes the form
θm − θH − λ(θh − θH ) − (1 − λ)(θl − θH ) = 0. For the remaining case k  h there has to be
again a case distinction regarding j , each case leading to the same result 0 0. Thus concavity
of R implies that there are no gaps in chosen investment, K = {k¯, . . . ,H − 1}. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The buyer’s strategy was constructed to make the seller indifferent
between the investments in the support of his strategy. In this proof, we are therefore concerned
15 Note that we could have shown more generally that K ⊂ {k with R(θk)R(θk+1)}.
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strategy. Following investment ik , the buyer is indifferent between all offers in {θk¯, . . . , θk} if
(1 − θl)
l∑
j=1
fjqjk = (1 − θk¯)
k¯∑
j=1
fjqjk for all k  l > k¯. (86)
With our definition of the seller’s strategies, we have for the right-hand side
(1 − θk¯)
k¯∑
j=1
fjqjk = λk − λk+1 (87)
and for the left-hand side
(1 − θl)
l∑
j=1
fjqjk = (1 − θl)
(
k¯∑
j=1
fj
λk − λk+1
R(θk¯)
+
l∑
j=k¯+1
fj
λk − λk+1
λj
)
= (1 − θl)(λk − λk+1)
(
1
1 − θk¯
+
l∑
j=k¯+1
(
1
1 − θj −
1
1 − θj−1
))
= λk − λk+1. (88)
The buyer prefers θk¯ to θl < θk¯ if
(1 − θl)
l∑
j=1
fjqjk  (1 − θk¯)
k¯∑
j=1
fjqjk. (89)
With qjk = qk¯k this condition reads
(1 − θl)F (θl) (1 − θk¯)F (θk¯) for all l < k¯ (90)
and hence is satisfied.
In the remainder of this proof we show that all qjk  0 and that they add up to one.
First, note that
R(θk) − R(θk−1)
θk − θk−1 =
fk(1 − θk−1)
(θk − θk−1) − F(θk)
= fk(1 − θk)
(θk − θk−1) − F(θk−1) (91)
and therefore
λk − λk+1 = (1 − θk)
(
R(θk) − R(θk−1)
θk − θk−1 −
R(θk+1) − R(θk)
θk+1 − θk
)
 0, (92)
where the latter holds because R is concave on {θk¯, . . . , θH }. Note further that for k = k¯
R(θk¯) λk¯+1 ⇔ (θk¯+1 − θk¯)F (θk¯) fk¯+1(1 − θk¯+1)
⇔ R(θ ¯)R(θ ¯ ). (93)k k+1
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H∑
k=j
qjk =
H∑
k=j
λk − λk+1
λj
= 1 for all j > k¯, (94)
H∑
k=k¯
qj k¯ = 1 −
λk¯+1
R(θk¯)
+
H∑
k=k¯+1
λk − λk+1
R(θk¯)
= 1 for all j  k¯.  (95)
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